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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-4083 
___________ 
 
WILLIAM H. PIERCE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT DAVID W. PITKINS,  
SCI Laurel Highlands;  
MS. ANNETTE KOWALESKI,  
C.H.C.A. SCI Laurel Highlands;  
MR. R.D. MASON, Physical Therapy Supervisor;  
DOCTOR SALAMEH, M.D., SCI Laurel Highlands 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3-12-cv-00131) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 14, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed April 8, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 William Pierce appeals pro se from the order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing Pierce’s civil complaint. 
 Pierce filed a complaint against medical and prison personnel employed at State 
Correctional Institute Laurel Highlands (“SCI-Laurel Highlands”).  Pierce raised claims 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title II, 42 
U.S.C. § 12132.  Pierce was previously incarcerated at State Correctional Institute 
Smithfield, but after developing health problems Pierce was transferred to SCI-Laurel 
Highlands for medical care in July 2011.  Pierce claimed that while at SCI-Laurel 
Highlands he received inadequate physical therapy, was improperly discharged from the 
physical therapy program, was not provided necessary medical aids, and did not receive 
proper treatment for abdominal and gastrointestinal illness.   
 The Magistrate Judge issued a report and recommendation recommending that the 
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.  The Magistrate Judge concluded that 
Pierce did not set forth a violation of either the Eighth Amendment or the ADA and that 
he failed to show that the non-medical personnel had any personal involvement; the 
Magistrate Judge granted Pierce leave to amend his complaint as to the defendants who 
were medical personnel, but he did not do so.  Pierce filed objections to the report and 
recommendation in which he further set forth the basis and argument in support of his 
claims.  On September 24, 2012, the District Court adopted the report and 
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recommendation and dismissed Pierce’s federal claims.1  Pierce timely filed a notice of 
appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District 
Court’s sua sponte dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is plenary, and “we must 
accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn therefrom.”  Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting 
Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).     
III. 
We will summarily affirm the District Court’s September 24, 2012 order 
dismissing Pierce’s complaint. 
The District Court properly dismissed Pierce’s claim that Defendants deprived him 
of medical care and therapy in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  For the delay or 
denial of medical care to rise to a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment, a prisoner must demonstrate “(1) that defendants 
were deliberately indifferent to [his] medical needs and (2) that those needs were 
serious.”  Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  Deliberate indifference 
requires proof that the official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate 
health or safety.”  Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 
                                              
1
 The District Court dismissed any potential state-law negligence claim without prejudice 
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2003) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).  We have found deliberate 
indifference where a prison official: “(1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical 
treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical treatment 
based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or 
recommended treatment.”  Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.  Deference is given to prison medical 
authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of patients, and courts “disavow any attempt to 
second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which) 
remains a question of sound professional judgment.”  Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. 
Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 
(4th Cir. 1977)).  Allegations of negligent treatment or medical malpractice do not trigger 
constitutional protections.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).   
Pierce’s complaint failed to allege that prison officials were deliberately 
indifferent to his medical needs.  First, Pierce’s allegation that his physical therapy was 
delayed or denied does not establish deliberate indifference.  Pierce was in physical 
therapy from August 2011 to November 2011 when he was discharged due to a lack of 
progress.  Pierce was readmitted to the physical therapy program in January 2012 and 
continued until March 2012 when he was discharged because it was determined he could 
continue the physical therapy exercises on his own.  Pierce’s disagreement with the 
method of physical therapy he received is not sufficient to establish a constitutional 
                                                                                                                                                  
to allow Pierce to file a complaint in state court. 
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claim.  See Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
Second, Pierce’s allegation that he was limited to using a regular wheelchair with 
cushion modifications instead of his preferred choice, a “geri-chair,” does not establish 
deliberate indifference.  Pierce alleged that the wheelchair he was provided aggravated 
his condition, despite the added cushioning and protective boot provided for his left foot.  
However, SCI-Laurel Highlands personnel concluded that because Pierce was able to 
propel and reposition himself in his wheel chair he was not a candidate for a geri-chair.  
Again, Pierce’s disagreement with his treatment does not establish a constitutional claim.  
See id.  
Pierce’s final allegations of a constitutional violation related to the treatment he 
received for abdominal and gastrointestinal illness also failed to establish deliberate 
indifference.  Pierce complained that he was not given x-rays of his abdomen to identify 
the source of his discomfort.  However, as treatment for his abdominal and 
gastrointestinal problems, Pierce was given regular enemas, provided with suppositories, 
treated with Gas X, treated for hemorrhoids, examined by Defendant Salameh, and 
assessed by a specialist.  Pierce alleged that the specialist stated x-rays could diagnose his 
abdominal pain and that in June 2012 when he finally received x-rays they revealed an 
impacted colon and infections.  Although denial or delay of reasonable requests for 
medical treatment can constitute deliberate indifference, see id. at 346-47, Pierce did not 
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allege that he was denied or delayed treatment for his gastrointestinal problems; rather, he 
alleged that he was denied his preferred method of treatment, which, in light of the 
treatment he was receiving, does not establish deliberate indifference.  See id. at 346 
(“[M]ere allegations of malpractice do not raise issues of constitutional import.”).  
Finally, Pierce’s claim that Defendants violated the ADA was properly dismissed.  
To establish a violation of Title II of the ADA, an inmate must allege that: (1) he is a 
qualified individual with a  disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation in or 
denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities, and (3) such 
exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.  See 42 
U.S.C. § 12132.  Pierce’s complaint asserted that Defendants violated the ADA and 
failed to allege any facts that demonstrated that the alleged inadequate or improper 
medical care he received was because of a disability.  Consequently, dismissal of this 
claim was appropriate.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons and because no substantial question is presented by this 
appeal, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Pierce’s 
complaint.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
 
 
 
